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Abstrat
We study the distributions of money in a simple losed eonomi system for dierent types
of monetary transations. We know that for arbitrary and random sharing but loally
onserving money transations, the money distribution goes to the Gibb's distribution of
statistial mehanis. We then onsider the eets of savings, et. and see how the distribu-
tion hanges. We also propose a new model where the agents invest equal amounts of money
in eah transation. We nd that for short time-periods, the money distribution obeys a
power-law with an exponent very lose to unity, and has an exponential tail; after a very
long time, this distribution ollapses and the entire amount of money goes to a tiny fration
of the population.
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1 Introdution
Eonomis deals with the real life around us. The area of eonomis is not only restrited
to the marketplae but also overs almost everything from the environment to family life!
Eonomis is the study of how soieties an use the sare resoures eiently to produe
valuable ommodities and distribute them among dierent people or eonomi agents [1, 2℄.
Finanial markets exhibit several properties that haraterize omplex systems. For nanial
markets, the governing rules are rather stable and the time evolution of the system an be
ontinuously monitored. Reently, an inreasing number of physiists have made attempts
to analyse and model nanial markets, and in general, eonomi systems [3, 4℄. The physis
ommunity took the rst interest in nanial and eonomi systems, when Majorana wrote
a pioneering paper [5℄ on the essential analogy between statistial laws in physis and in the
soial sienes. This o-the-trak outlook did not reate muh interest until reent times. In
fat, prior to the 1990's, a very few professional physiists like Kadano [6℄ and Montroll [7℄,
took muh interest for researh in soial or eonomi systems. Sine 1990, physiists started
turning to this interdisiplinary subjet, and their researh ativity is omplementary to the
most traditional approahes of nane and mathematial nane. It may be surprising to
the students of physial sienes but the rst use of power-law distribution was made by an
Italian soial eonomist Pareto, a entury ago, who investigated the wealth of individuals in
a stable eonomy by modelling them using the distribution
y ∼ x−υ,
where y is the number of people having inome greater than or equal to x and υ is an exponent
whih he estimated to be 1.5 [8℄. Almost during the same time, the rst formalization of a
random walk was made by a Frenh mathematiian Bahelier in his dotoral thesis [9℄, where
he used the inrements of Brownian motion to model `absolute' prie hanges. A major part
of the reent eorts made by physiists has gone in investigating the nature of utuations
and their distributions in the stok markets [3℄. We believe that a thorough understanding
of the statistial mehanis of the money market, espeially studying of the distribution
funtions, is essential. There has been some very interesting papers along this line [10, 11,
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12, 13, 14℄. Here, we make a very brief review of the earlier models and then propose a new
variant where the agents invest equal amounts of money in eah transation. We nd that
for short time-periods, the money distribution obeys a power-law with an exponent very
lose to unity, and has an exponential tail; after a very long time, this distribution ollapses
and the entire amount of money goes to a tiny fration of the population.
2 Brief review of models and distributions of money
We onsider a model of a losed eonomi system where the total amount of money M is
onserved and the number of eonomi agents N is xed. Eah eonomi agent i, whih
may be an individual or a orporate, possesses money mi. An eonomi agent an exhange
money with any other agent through some trade, keeping the total amount of money of both
the agents onserved. We assume that an agent's money must always be non-negative and
therefore no debt is permitted.
2.1 Random transations
Let an arbitrary pair of agents i and j get engaged in a trade so that their money mi and mj
hange by amounts ∆mi and ∆mj to beome m
′
i and m
′
j , where ∆mi is a random fration
of (mi + mj) and ∆mj is the rest of it, so that onservation of the total money in eah
trade is ensured. The money distribution goes to the equilibrium Gibb's distribution [15℄
of statistial mehanis: P (m) = (1/T ) exp(−m/T ) where temperature T = M/N , the
average money per agent in the market, satisfying P (mi)P (mj) = P (mi +mj).
Extensive numerial simulations show that this and various modiations of trade, like
multi-agent transations, et., all lead to the robust Gibb's distribution [see Fig. 1℄, inde-
pendent of the initial distribution the market starts with [12℄. So, most of the agents end-up
in this market with very little money.
2.2 Transations with onstant saving
Let us introdue the onept of saving, whih is a very natural and important ingredient
in eonomis, in our model. We assume that eah eonomi agent saves a onstant amount
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of money mo before trading. Let us now onsider that an arbitrary pair of agents i and j
get engaged in a trade so that their money mi and mj hange by amounts ∆mi and ∆mj to
beome m′i and m
′
j ; ∆mi = ǫ(mi +mj − 2mo) and ∆mj = (1 − ǫ)(mi +mj − 2mo), where
ǫ is a random number between zero and unity, and m′i = mo + ∆mi and m
′
j = mo + ∆mj
after the trade. In this ase, the lower limit of money that an agent is allowed to possess
atually hanges from zero to mo. Conservation of the total money in eah trade is ensured,
as earlier.
The probability distribution of money still remains the Gibb's distribution [see Fig. 2℄
but the money orresponding to maximum probability mp, shifts from zero (or very little
money) to mo, and the temperature T hanges. When mo = 0, we get bak the ase of 2.1
on the preeding page.
2.3 Transations with frational saving (marginal propensity of sav-
ing)
We now onsider the ase where eah eonomi agent saves a fration λ of its money mi
before trading [11℄. This onstant fration of saving λ is alled the marginal propensity of
saving and is a very important quantity in eonomis.
Here, we hoose randomly two agents i and j having money mi and mj , respetively.
Then ∆mi = ǫ(1 − λ)(mi +mj) and ∆mj = (1 − ǫ)(1 − λ)(mi +mj), where ǫ is a random
number between zero and unity. Then m′i = λmi + ∆mi and m
′
j = λmj + ∆mj after the
trade. Conservation of the total money in eah trade is ensured, as earlier.
The results for the equilibrium distribution P (m) are shown in Fig. 3, for some values of
λ. The real money exhanged randomly in any trade is less than the total money, beause
of the saving by eah agent. This destroys the multipliative property of the distribution
P (m) (seen earlier for λ = 0) and P (m) hanges from the Gibb's form to the asymmetri
Gaussian-like form as soon as a nite λ is introdued. The λ = 0 ase, same as in 2.1
on the page before, was pratially a random-noise dominated one and therefore eetively
a non-interating market. Introdution of a nite amount of saving (λ 6= 0), ditated by
individual self-interest, immediately makes the money dynamis ooperative and the global
ordering (in the distribution) is ahieved.
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An important feature of this humped distribution P (m) at any non-vanishing λ is the
variation of the most probable money mp(λ) ( where P (m) beomes maximum) of the agents
[11℄. We have, mp = 0 for λ = 0 (Gibb's distribution) and most of the eonomi agents in
the market end-up losing most of their money. However, even with pure self-interest of
eah agent for saving a fator λ of its own money at any trade, a global feature emerges:
the entire market ends-up with a most-probable money mp(λ). This mp(λ) shifts in an
interesting manner from mp = 0 (for λ = 0) to mp → T (for λ → 1). The half-width ∆mp
and the peak height Pmp of the equilibrium distribution sale pratially as (1 − λ)
1/2
and
(1− λ)−1/2 respetively. We also note that eah individual's money mi utuates randomly.
Sine the total money is onserved, 〈mi〉 remains onstant (= T ) here, while ∆mi goes down
with λ as (1 − λ). This is beause at any time the agents keep a xed fration of their
individual money and reeive a random fration of the money traded proportional to (1−λ).
3 Model and simulation results
We now introdue a new model where we assume that both the eonomi agents invest
the same amount of money mmin, the minimum money between the agents. We hoose
randomly two agents i and j having money mi and mj , respetively. Thus 2mmin is the
real money whih is available in the market for random sharing. Then ∆mi = ǫ2mmin
and ∆mj = (1 − ǫ)2mmin, where ǫ is a random number between zero and unity. Then
m′i = (mi−mmin)+∆mi and m
′
j = (mj −mmin)+∆mj after the trade. Conservation of the
total money in eah trade is ensured, as earlier. Note that we may rewrite the amounts of
money after trade as m′i = mi+αmmin and m
′
j = mj−αmmin, where α(= 2ǫ−1) is a random
fration whose absolute value is less than unity, i.e., −1 < α < 1 and mmin is either mi or
mj , whihever is less. We onsider one transation between any arbitrary pair of agents as a
unit of `time', t. We made omputer simulations for agents N = 1000 and the total money in
the market M = 1000 and then took averages over 5000 dierent ongurations. We studied
the money distribution P (m) at dierent times.
The money distribution P (m) for time t = 10000 is shown in Fig. 4. We nd that the
distribution obeys a power-law: P (m) ∼ m−υ, where υ is an exponent, and has a tail whih
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falls o exponentially (∼ exp(−αm)). The numerially tted urves (indiated by the solid
line and the dashed urve in the gure) give the following exponents: υ = 0.9± 0.01, whih
is very lose to unity, and α = 0.25± 0.02. The errors are obtained by eye-estimation.
We note that one an agent loses all its money, it is unable to trade any more beause
mmin beomes zero and no other agent will invest money for trade with this agent. Thus, a
trader is eetively driven out of the market one it loses all its money. In this way, after
an innite number of transations have taken plae, one would expet that only one trader
survives in the market with the entire amount of money and the rest of the traders have zero
money. In our numerial simulations, we found that for t = 15000000, more than 99% of
the traders have zero money and the rest have the entire money of the market. This an be
prevented, for example, by government intervention via taxes, but we do not onsider any
suh thing in our model.
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Figure aptions
Fig. 1 : Histogram of money, obtained from omputer simulations made for agentsN = 1000
and total moneyM = 1000. Note that in the gure, the money has been saled by the average
money in the market.
Fig. 2 : Histogram of money for dierent saving amounts mo = 0.2 and mo = 0.8, obtained
from omputer simulations made for agents N = 1000 and total money M = 1000. Note
that in the gure, the money has been saled by the average money in the market.
Fig. 3 : Histogram of money for dierent saving propensity fator λ = 0.2 and λ = 0.8,
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obtained from omputer simulations made for agents N = 1000 and total money M = 1000.
Note that in the gure, the money has been saled by the average money in the market.
Fig. 4 : Histogram of money plotted in the double logarithmi sale, obtained from omputer
simulations made for agents N = 1000 and total money M = 1000, at time t = 10000. The
solid line is the numerially tted line with slope υ = 0.9 and the dashed urve is the
numerially tted exponential urve with an exponent α = 0.25. Note that in the gure, the
money has been saled by the average money in the market.
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